Itnetic logo Itnetic Technologies
  • Pricing
  • Discord
Game protectionMinecraft serversBot joins, ping floods and connection attacks stopped before they reach your server. No plugin, no mod, nothing for players to install.Explore game protection →

For websites and APIs

  • DDoS ProtectionLayer-7 mitigation for attacks that look like real traffic.
  • Web CDNEdge caching on the network that filters your attacks.
  • PricingFree tier, then plans from €5/month.

How it works

  • The edge pipelineChallenge gate, behavioral signatures, WAF, rate limits and cache.
  • Logs & analyticsPer-request visibility and the exact verdict behind every block.
  • NetworkPoints of presence across Europe, North America and Asia Pacific.

Learn

  • GuidesPlain-English explainers on DDoS, WAFs, rate limiting and CDNs.
  • HTTP header checkGrade any site’s security headers in a few seconds.
  • FAQThe questions we get asked before people sign up.
  • ChangelogWhat shipped, and when.

Compare

  • vs Cloudflare
  • vs DDoS-Guard
  • vs CDN77
  • vs WEDOS
  • Status ↗
Log inUnder attack?
Game protectionDDoS ProtectionWeb CDNPricing
The edge pipelineLogs & analyticsNetwork
GuidesHTTP header checkFAQChangelogvs Cloudflarevs DDoS-Guardvs CDN77vs WEDOSStatus ↗
PricingDiscord
Log inUnder attack?

Learn · Minecraft

How to protect your Minecraft server IP

Every protective layer in front of a Minecraft server assumes attackers have to go through it. The moment your machine’s real address is known, that assumption is gone and the protection is decoration.

Updated August 18, 2026 · Itnetic team — reviewed by Petr Chlíbek, founder

Key takeaways

  • Putting a proxy in front of your server hides the address from the general public, but it does not un-publish an address that has already leaked.
  • The most common leaks are old DNS records, a website or panel on the same machine, and status-listing sites that recorded the address before you moved.
  • If the address has ever been public, changing it is the only real fix — and it should be changed to something that has never appeared anywhere.
  • Firewall the server so it only accepts connections from the protection network. Without that, knowing the address is enough to bypass everything.
  • A proxy that authenticates players and forwards them into an offline-mode server creates a second, worse problem: anyone who reaches the backend can claim to be anyone.
  • A gate that lets the server keep its own authentication avoids that hole entirely, at the cost of one reconnect the first time.

Why the address matters more than it does for a website

Protection for a Minecraft server works by being in the path. Connections arrive at the protection network, get screened, and only the survivors are relayed to your machine. Everything described in Minecraft server DDoS protection depends on that.

An attacker who knows your machine's real address does not have to use that path. They send the flood directly, and every layer you paid for is standing in a corridor nobody is walking down. This is the single most common reason a server operator says "we have protection and we still went down".

How the address leaks

Old DNS records. By far the most common. You point play.example.com at the protection network, and an A record on the bare domain, on an old subdomain, or on something like mc.example.com or map.example.com still points at the machine. Historical DNS is archived by several public services, so a record you deleted last year is still queryable.

Something else on the same machine. A website, a dynmap, a control panel, a Git server, a mail service. If any of them resolves directly to the box, the box is public. This is why "the Minecraft port is protected" is not the same as "the machine is protected".

Server listing sites. Many record the resolved address at the time you submitted your server, and some display it. If you listed the server before moving behind protection, assume the old address is on record somewhere.

Your own history. Screenshots in a Discord, a forum post from when you were troubleshooting, an old client's server list on a member's machine, a support ticket. Addresses persist in places you do not control.

Error messages and headers. Anything on the machine that reports its own hostname or address in an error page, an email header, or a certificate can publish it without anybody attacking anything.

What to actually do

1. Assume it leaked and move. If the address has ever been public, changing it is the only real fix. Get a new address, and make sure it has never appeared anywhere — a fresh IP on the same provider that you already used for something else is not fresh.

2. Firewall the server to the protection network. This is the step people skip and it is the one that matters most. The server should accept connections on the game port from the protection network's addresses and from nowhere else. Without this, knowing the address is enough to bypass everything, and with it, knowing the address is worth much less.

3. Move everything else off the machine, or behind protection too. Your website, your map, your panel. One unprotected service is enough to publish the address of all of them.

4. Clean up DNS. Every record that resolves to the origin, including ones you think nobody uses. Check the bare domain, common subdomains, and any mail records that point at the same host.

5. Do not put the real address in the MOTD, in a Discord channel topic, or in a support reply. It sounds obvious. It is still the most common way an address comes back after a move.

The general web version of this problem is covered in How to hide your origin IP; the same reasoning applies, with the addition that a game server usually has more services bolted to the same machine.

The trap on the other side: offline mode behind a proxy

There is a second address-related failure that is specific to Minecraft, and it is worth understanding before choosing how your protection works.

Many proxies authenticate the player themselves and then log into your server on the player's behalf. For that to work, your server has to be set to offline mode, because the player has already proven themselves to the proxy and will not prove themselves twice. The proxy then tells the server who the player is.

That message is the whole identity model. In the modern forwarding scheme it is signed with a shared secret, so your server can refuse a join that did not come from your proxy. In the legacy scheme it is four strings in the handshake with no signature at all — anyone who can reach the backend can claim to be anyone, including your administrators.

So with a forwarding proxy in front of an offline-mode server, a leaked address is not merely a way to send you a flood. It is a way to join as any username you like. Your firewall is the only thing standing between an attacker and your server's entire permission system, which is a lot of weight for one iptables rule to carry.

The alternative: keep your server's own authentication

There is a design that avoids this entirely. Instead of terminating the player's session and forwarding it, the protection acts as a gate: it completes the login itself, proves the account, hands the client a token, and ends the connection. The client comes back — automatically on modern versions, by clicking the server again on older ones — and the returning connection is relayed straight through.

The consequences are worth spelling out, because they are the reason to prefer it:

  • Your server stays in online mode and authenticates every player itself, exactly as it does today. No reconfiguration.
  • The "leaked address means anyone can be anyone" hole never opens, because the server is still doing its own authentication. A leaked address is back to being a DDoS problem instead of an identity problem.
  • No forwarding secret to manage, and no version-specific session translation on the login path.

The cost is one reconnect the first time a player is asked to verify. On clients from 1.20.5 onwards the game does it automatically and the player does not notice; on older clients they click the server once more.

What "hiding" actually buys you

Be clear-eyed about it. Putting a proxy in front of your server means the address your community passes around is not your machine's address, and that is genuinely most of the benefit — casual attackers use the address they were given. It does not un-publish an address that has already been published, and it does not help at all if your machine still accepts connections from the internet at large.

Hiding is a layer. The firewall is the enforcement.

Itnetic's game protection uses the gate design described above, so your server keeps its own authentication and stays in online mode.

FAQ

Quick answers

Does using a proxy hide my Minecraft server IP?

It means players connect to the proxy rather than to your machine, so your server’s own address is not what your community passes around. Anything already published stays published, so if the address has ever been public it is still worth changing.

How do attackers find a Minecraft server’s real IP?

Usually old DNS records, another service on the same machine (a website, map or panel), or a server listing site that recorded the address before you moved. Occasionally from screenshots, forum posts or support conversations.

Do I still need a firewall if I use a proxy?

Yes, and it is the more important half. If the server accepts connections from anywhere, knowing the address bypasses every layer of protection. Restrict the game port to the protection network’s addresses.

Is offline mode behind a proxy safe?

Only as safe as the firewall in front of it, and only if the proxy uses a signed forwarding scheme. Legacy forwarding has no signature at all, so anyone who can reach the backend can claim to be any username. A design that lets your server keep its own authentication avoids the question.

Should I change my server IP after an attack?

If the attack reached your machine directly rather than the protection in front of it, yes — the address is known and will be used again. Change it, firewall the new one, and audit everything that could re-publish it.

Keep reading

01

Minecraft CAPTCHA and player verification

A web CAPTCHA can rely on a browser, a rendering engine and a third-party service. A Minecraft challenge has none of those — and the client it is trying to test may not be rendering anything at all.

02

Minecraft bot attacks and join floods

A bot attack does not try to fill your network link. It makes your server do the most expensive thing it knows how to do — log a player in — thousands of times a second, until nothing is left for the people already playing.

03

Ping floods and server queues

Two problems that look unrelated and share a solution: a server should not have to answer every ping itself, and a full server should not have to turn people away.

04

What is a Minecraft anticheat?

Every login check is bounded: a real account, a solved code, a reconnect. A player who paid all of them can still fly. An anticheat is the layer that watches what happens after the door.

05

Killaura and reach hacks

Combat cheats are the ones your community actually reports, and the hardest to judge — because the difference between a killaura and a genuinely good player is not how hard they hit, it is what their camera was doing.

06

Minecraft server DDoS protection

A Minecraft server is not a website. It holds long-lived connections, spends real CPU on every join attempt, and can be taken off the air by traffic that never looks like a flood on a bandwidth graph.

Protect my server freeHow our protection works
Itnetic logo Itnetic Technologies

DDoS protection that keeps your customers online. Attacks filtered at the edge in every region, real visitors served straight through.

Find us on GoogleAdd as preferred source

Product

  • Under attack?
  • DDoS Mitigation
  • Web CDN
  • Game Protection
  • Network
  • Pricing

Resources

  • Learn
  • HTTP header check
  • Changelog
  • FAQ
  • Status
  • Discord

Legal

  • Acceptable Use
  • SLA
  • Security
  • Abuse
  • Sub-processors
  • Data Retention
  • Incident Response

Company

  • Founder
  • Contact
Petr ChlíbekIČO: 21210756Neplátce DPH
© 2026 Itnetic Technologies. All rights reserved.
Terms of ServicePrivacy PolicyCookie PolicyDPAIP geolocation by DB-IP (CC BY 4.0)